Interesting opinion poll published by Libération on Wednesday: when asked the question “What should Europe do now that Ireland has rejected the Lisbon Treaty?” most people (44%) answered that Ireland should vote a second time (with a few amendments to the text to make allowances for their hesitations), 26% said the EU should forge ahead with the Treaty anyway, ignoring Ireland and only 24% said the Lisbon Treaty should now be discarded (technically automatic if one country does not ratify). In other words this sample of ordinary French people agree with their President and conform to my earlier post that it’s not up to “little” countries to spoil what the “big” countries have decided is best.

However, the fact that 70% believe that either recalcitrant Ireland should be made to vote again or should be ignored is odd, coming from the country which only three years ago rejected the Constitution. Had they been told three years ago “Oh well, never mind, we’ll ignore your vote and pass the Constitution anyway”, I don’t think they would have been best pleased. Certainly there would have been much shouting that “No one in Brussels ever listens to ordinary people!” Yet now it seems French people are ready to turn a deaf ear on Ireland.

What emerges more generally from this poll and others being conducted as France prepares to take on the rotating Presidency is that people think Europe (thus Brussels) should interfere more in their daily lives! I can’t think there are many other countries that would agree with that. Apparently the French when polled believe that Brussels should have a greater control over everyday things such as the cost of petrol, their purchasing power, unemployment, tax regimes: all things which are usually jealously guarded by individual countries. The European Union was never conceived as controlling prices, immigration or employment – and getting 27 members to agree would be clearly impossible. When they do agree on something – such as VAT – France then gets upset because they can’t change it when they want to, for restaurants for example or, more recently, the VAT on diesel for fishermen. That inability to change Brussels rules at will is presumably why, again in very recent polls, 37% say that France has not benefitted from the Union (they are obviously not farmers!).

This is a relatively new and rather ominous feeling, that belonging to Europe must benefit you personally in some way. Nicolas Sarkozy has tuned into that and said while France has the presidency he wants to connect Brussels’ policies to ordinary people’s lives. But very few (39%) believe that he can change much. Whereas a year ago 60% of French people thought belonging to Europe was a Good Thing, now as they approach this much-heralded 6-month stint in the hot seat, only 48% think that. Or at least that’s what they tell the telephone polsters….

Two nice items from Jean Quatremer, a journalist with Libération who also a good French blog on Europe: first the air-time given to Europe on all the main TV news programmes. INA, the French national broadcasting watchdog, reports that in 2007 the EU represented only 2.2% of all subjects covered on national news channels. Were it not for the somewhat select Arte (6%, with 213 items), the figure would be even lower: TF2, the main public broadcasting channel, had only 127 items, 1.6% of its total. Of the 31,629 news items broadcast on all subjects on all channels (who on earth has to count that lot?), only 716 were about the EU. Well, we always knew it was a switch-off and clearly French news editors agree.

The second piece is more amusing, and could illustrate what I said in an earlier post about the way “little” countries are ignored by the “mighty”. Quatremer says that even for regular Brussels-based staffers like himself it’s very hard to remember who’s who in all the 27 member countries. Last Friday during the summit about the Irish No he found himself chatting with a bunch of international journalists (doubtless discussing expenses) in the main Press Room. After a while he noticed man in a smart suit quietly talking to a journalist, with, hovering behind him, “a gorilla”. Clearly the suit was important, but who the hell wuzzee? All the hacks began asking each other the same question, but no one knew the answer. Finally Quatremer asked someone he didn’t know, smart, sweating in the heat “Who is that guy over there? Is he a prime minister?” “Yes,” said the sweating man, “he is a prime minister.” All the journalists together: “Oh right.” Then: “Where from?” “Estonia,” said their unknown helper. “Oh great. Thanks. You know with all these new countries it’s impossible to tell who some of these guys are …..” At that moment a young woman whispered in Quatremer’s ear: “You’re talking to Estonia’s Foreign Minister.” That sinking feeling. But the young woman saved him by adding: “since we don’t have many journalists of our own, we always come in here just in case any of the international press want to meet us….” I think I’ll go to Estonia – it sounds like they have a healthy attitude towards both press and politics – just a job like any other.

A reader has raised the question of what effect Sarkozy’s White Book on Defence will have on the French troops in Afghanistan. By definition long-term defence strategy is difficult to penetrate and I have asked a friend with contacts at Stratfor, an American military strategy think-tank, to dig deeper. In the meantime I suspect sending more French troops to Afghanistan was simply part of the basic philosophy behind the book: showing that the French military is capable of integrating with other professional armies. This is not just a matter of military techniques and equipment, but the much deeper question of trust. In the 1980’s and 1990’s the French military working in co-operation with multi-national forces was accused by the Americans of passing strategic information to the enemy. According to the Americans this happened systematically in the Middle East (from memory the Lebanon) and then more seriously in the Bosnia campaign. Consequently the Americans decided to exclude the French from their strategic thinking (with sad echoes of course of Churchill’s attitude towards De Gaulle before D-Day). Whether or not the accusations were true, the trust had been shattered and as in any relationship once that happens it’s an uphill task to regain it.

Sarkozy’s over-riding ambition is to get France back on the world stage, economically, industrially and militarily. He wants to rejoin NATO, but not just as another bit-player providing squadies for cannon-fodder: he is insisting (his word) that France must be part of the operational command, be in the driving seat of a major campaign. But he knows the US won’t let France back until French officers have proved they can keep secrets. Afghanistan is seen as a “modern” war (i.e. against religious fanatics with a complex intelligence structure) far more interesting than periodically protecting French businessmen by containing riots in obscure (and increasingly irrelevant) West and Central African townships (where most of the French army currently works, in the ever-restive former colonies).

So as a step towards his higher ambition he increased the French force in Afghanistan. The problem is that (as his Intelligence people must have warned him), he did this at exactly the moment the conflict in Afghanistan began evolving into something particularly nasty, so he may find, if more than a handful of French troops are killed, that rather than please the now out-dated American administration his policy backfires at home.

The success of any leader relies to a large extent on his/her instinct to make the right choice. It’s partly a question of having a natural flair, partly simply knowing the game so well you make the right choice without thinking. It seems to me that since his election Sarkozy’s instinct has increasingly been playing him false: like an off-form tennis-player he keeps making the wrong move – the way he decided to handle his divorce/re-marriage, his choice of international partners (Bush, Gaddafi, Bashir Assad), his choice of which reforms to go for first at home and now which military campaign to use to increase his army’s credibility. Often that instinct can be brought back, but whether in high office that’s possible I’m not sure.

Still on the Defence White Book (see previous post), it always fascinates me how different people, particularly different nationalities, report the same event. Things considered crucial by the foreign press are not even mentioned in France. For example commenting on Sarkozy’s military plans the French press has understandably concentrated firstly on the reduction in size (54,000 men fewer), then France’s re-integration into NATO, the enormous boosting of French intelligence services and the emphasis on spare parts and maintenance of existing materiel (again, see previous post). The French press makes no mention at all of what American commentator Judah Grunstein in World Politics Review considers the key element: “But the real story to my eyes is the prominence of Asia as a strategic focus of interest, which surprised me. The document doesn’t make a case for intervention so much as careful management, calling for the West to take a greater interest in stabilization of region. It makes mention of the continent’s three nuclear powers, three major unresolved crises (Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Straits and Kashmir), and the lack of any real regional, multilateral security instrument.”

Grunstein gives a good résumé of the book, ending by wondering how it will be paid for. Recently the Defence Minister Hervé Morin told parliament about the “wall of debt” left by his predecessor (Michèle Alliot-Marie). At the 2007 Salon du Bourget the Minister added that the situation was so bad that investment would have to be increased by 43%. He must be very disappointed/worried by the White Book. Indeed in that he is echoed by Grunstein, who ends his piece by saying that while the Book is “an impressive document that manages to coherently make its case for achieving a smaller, more mobile and more effective force, [it never] really addresses the difficulties that creates for a country with a widening regional focus, increasing global ambition, and increasingly limited budget. There’s also a tension between the kind of army the Livre Blanc foresees, which is almost Rumsfeldian, and the missions it foresees being called upon to carry out, which are distinctly Petraeussian.” In plain French, while la Grande Armée may not be grande anymore, that will not compromise French grandeur.

When Nicolas Sarkozy was first elected president, the world’s press eagerly compared him with Napoleon. After a while, however, the comparison palled, and now with the publication of the White Book on the future of France’s defence, I imagine the ashes of the diminutive Corsican are spinning in disarray within his elegant Les Invalides mausoleum as he sees how low his erstwhile Grande Armée has sunk.

“For how long could France stave off an attack from Belgium?” With this not entirely rhetorical question Le Canard Enchainé last week opened a series of not entirely light-hearted articles on the parlous state of the French military. During one of her early inspections, for example, Michèle Alliot-Marie, then Defence Minister, was amazed to see rows of helicopters left on the ground when she expected them to be buzzing around her in some sort of flattering if meaningless display: “not enough spares, ma’am”, muttered some hapless General. “These machines all had to be cannibalised so that you could fly here today” Things have changed since, Le Canard assures us: they’ve got worse.

One of the key points of the report, published this Tuesday, is that by reducing the size of the military force by a sixth, more money will be spent on those spare parts and routine maintenance. Not very glamorous, perhaps, but doubtless a good thing for France’s reputation: last week Le Canard Enchainé gave a hilarious (or appalling, depending on your point of view) account of the misadventures of the French military attempting to free the crew of a private yacht the Ponant taken hostage by pirates off the coast of Somalia in early April (already referred to in an earlier blog).

Within moments of the original mayday message the French military leapt into action, backed by the Elysée who clearly imagined a James Bond-like operation giving French gloire the chance to shine (it was an unequal combat, most of the pirates were Somali fishermen) in the spotlight of the world’s press. Having alerted TV stations, the nearest French frigate, the 30 year-old “Jean-Bart” cruising off Abu Dhabi, was immediately ordered full ahead both to engage the pirates without delay. An unwise decision: under the sudden and unaccustomed strain her engines immediately broke down. So another frigate, the “Surcouf” at Djibouti, was immediately despatched at action stations to show the pirating community that under Sarkozy force would be met with force. Unfortunately a “technical problem” meant the “Surcouf” was unable to leave her moorings. Meanwhile the “Jean-Bart”, sparing no effort and flaunting the 35-hour week, had affected running repairs and actually made good headway for a few miles until once again her engines seized up and she once more ploughed to a halt.

Now enter the helicopter-carrier, the mighty “Jeanne d’Arc”, steaming with its valiant escort off the coast of Madagascar. Normally her top speed is 12 knots but under pressure from the President himself (the yacht they were attempting to liberate belongs to his friend) her captain threw caution to the winds and ordered 20. Engines complaining loudly, she surged ahead, leaving her escort far in her wake – indeed her escort was stationery, two of her four alternators had collapsed and she was out of action. Luckily the “Jeanne d’Arc” kept going, for the only two shore-based helicopters had also both failed: one was simply unable to get off the ground, the other flew but with its red alarm buzzer screaming constantly.

Meanwhile Atlantic 2, a maritime surveillance aircraft, had been ordered to trail the Ponant and, by its mere presence, fill the pirates with terror. However in true Biggles fashion, just as she took up her threatening position one engine caught fire. The 27 year old plane avoided ignominiously crashing into the sea in front of the world’s lenses and managed to glide to the Yemeni coast to belly-flop on the sand. Its nearest partner, 6,000 kms away in Brittany, was sent to replace it. Also sent from France were of course the elite commando who were to effect the daring rescue bid. Parachuted into the warm sea they swam around the Ponant like dolphins, but with hostages on board decided not to attempt anything untoward. Instead they clambered out on to the “Jean Bart”, whose engines had been repaired for the second time and, luckily for the swimmers, had now finally arrived.

Commander-in-Chief Sarkozy (“J’en ai l’habitude – I’m used to this sort of thing” he reassuringly told relatives of the hostages) decided that the time for action had come: nothing less than a full-frontal boarding of the be-pirated Ponant by the commandos would do. Using a combination of daring, speed, skill and surprise they could overpower the fisher-folk before any hostages were harmed. No sooner was the plan formed in the leader’s mind than the order was given. The commandos and their war-kit were hurriedly, stealthily bundled into the only tender available – which, overloaded, promptly capsized and sank. With their kit at the bottom of the Indian Ocean, the only thing the commandos could do was to wait for the pirates to reach land, where they were awarded the $2,150,000 ransom.

True, as they drove away one of their jeeps was hit by helicopter fire, a handful of pirates seized and their part of the dosh recovered. Their colleagues and the remaining ransom disappeared into the thick Somali dust.

Before any reader accuses me of mild exaggeration, not to say total fictionalisation, this week’s Canard reports that a military spokesman confirmed the scurrilous newspaper’s version of events at a press conference .

The Franco-German axis is one of those aspects of the French culture and history badly understood by most British observers. Like the concept of laïcité and republicanism, it is embedded in the French (and possibly German, I don’t know) mind and taken, mostly unthinkingly, as part of the natural order. It is the very root of the European Community, the reason it is there at all. Many times during the past 60 years it has saved the Common Market, the EC or the EU from crisis – especially when the Union consisted of a dozen or so members. But times have changed, with 27 members the internal chemistry is entirely different. Yet, as Francois Bonnet writes in Mediapart, the Franco-German axis is “tabou. It cannot be questioned without being taken for someone ill-bred, someone who has forgotten our history and suffering.”

The French press repeats like a mantra that the Irish No was a terrible slap in the face for Sarkozy – but that’s only because a year ago they greatly exaggerated his creative input into the revised Constitution. They claimed then that the ideas behind the Treaty were his, ignoring the reality that the 16 senior European politicians of the Amato Group had worked on it for months and Angela Merkel, when Germany had the presidency of Europe, had already persuaded all EU members to sign the Berlin Declaration: “we are united in our aim of placing the EU on a renewed common basis before the EU Parliamentary elections in 2009”. That was in March 2007, while Sarkozy was still on the campaign trail. As soon as he was elected he injected impetus, it is true, going to see Angela Merkel the day of his investiture and emerging soon afterwards with “his” treaty - the gullible must believe that the pillars of the EU can only be forged by the Franco-German axis.

If the Irish No was a slap in the face for anyone it was not Sarkozy but for that rigid, too-often immutable relationship at the heart of the old Union. Even though the Union is now an entirely different beast, the voices of at least 23 members are still too rarely heard. Who cares what Cyprus thinks about the Lisbon Treaty? Malta? Lithuania? If they dare express an opinion, the countries of Eastern Europe are told to “shut up” (by Sarkozy’s predecessor), even Tony Blair was publicly called “badly brought-up” for daring to contradict the French President of the time.

Unfortunately that arrogance persists in Paris and Berlin: “A No would be taken badly, coming from a people who have benefitted so much from Europe”, declared France’s Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner. Yet as Francois Bonnet says, Ireland has been a member for 35 years, during which time, he calculates, Ireland has received 40 billion euro, “less than a tenth of the grants received by French farmers from Brussels” over the same period. Indeed one does wonder what Kouchner was thinking - it’s not as if his own compatriots were immune to biting the hand that has fed them so generously over the past 60 years. But that’s the point: he can say to the “little countries” what he dare not say to his compatriots. Neither is he the only member of Sarkozy’s government believing the opinions of those countries have little relevance. The votes were still coming in when Jean-Pierre Jouyet, France’s European Minister, was publicly suggesting a Franco-German initiative to find “un arrangement juridique” which would allow the other 26 members to bury the Irish No, treating it like a fart at table by pretending nothing had happened.

Echoing those two Sarkozy ministers, Le Monde called for the “marginalisation” of Ireland, while Germany’s foreign minister suggested Ireland should take a break from the EU: the Franco-German duo stepping in quickly to fill the embarrassed void, fixing things between them to their own advantage and above all for their own survival. In 2002, on the eve of the Brussels summit on the CAP, they did this behind closed doors. It’s doubtful they would resort to those depths again, but they still have not understood it’s their continued insistence that they are the brain of Europe, coupled with their refusal to hear what Europeans are telling them that makes so many either eurosceptical or merely euro-bored. Of course that works to their advantage too…….

Now could be the time to re-start this blog. France is poised to take over the presidency of Europe at the very moment Ireland’s rejection of the Lisbon Treaty has released a further deluge of anti-European invective – and at the very moment France faces humiliating elimination from the European Football Championship. The French press is still undecided which is more important to their readers.

The French President has long promised us that his six-month presidency of Europe would re-establish France’s pre-eminence throughout the world, particularly the Mediterranean world which he sees as ripe for receiving greater influence from France. But that ambition alone has already caused friction with Germany, said to be France’s closest European ally, and last week further backfired on Sarkozy by being publicly scoffed and rejected by the man who Sarkozy thought was his closest ally in the Med, the ever-unsettling “Guide and Brotherly Leader” – Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi. Sarkozy is not the first head of state to burn his fingers trying to deal too closely with him and at the same time he is playing with fire by inviting the Mediterranean’s other difficult and dangerous leader, Bashar Al-Assad of Syria to a place of honour at the 14^th July military parade. His choice of friends has raised many diplomatic eye-brows. The next few months will either establish Sarkozy as a man of skill and substance or confirm many French people’s suspicions that he is a disappointment and many non-French people’s intuitions that France and/or Europe have simply lost their relevance in the world. In the New year we shall also see whether M. Sarkozy is clever enough to smudge over his friendship with George W. Bush and win the trust of the new US President.

He wants to shine on the international stage and has relished accession to the supposed power of the European presidency ever since he was elected president of France. In the present circumstances, however, he needs to shine on the international stage, for things at home have not turned out as he promised. I’m sure there’s no call for me to go into details here: anyone reading this blog is going to have some idea of what’s not been happening in France, even during my absence – on the subject of which it’s been useful for me to have a break, and I’m touched by the people who wrote in asking when the blog was coming back (I see the main Prospect blog has dropped its link). There was however one reader delighted I had finally stopped criticising his president and had apparently gone back to my “murky island”, where, he added, he hoped I would be “stabbed in the balls by some yobo”. He may be disappointed, but at this particularly vital time for Sarkozy and for France I shall carry on for a while.